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Abstract 
 
The paper focuses on the foreign debt management of the Hungarian and Slovenian 
policy makers in the global financial markets. The proposed argument combines a 
theoretical refinement of international financial markets as locally embedded social 
relations with a domestically oriented institutional analysis of foreign debt management. I 
argue that in order to understand the differences between the two states’ debt 
management strategies, it is important to look at the institutional differences within which 
the strategies were proposed, rejected or accepted. At this level of analysis the paper also 
considers the links between globalization of finance and the changing role of the state.  
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1. Introduction1
 
The global reconfiguration of financial markets has been attracting the attention of 
analysts from various fields of social sciences. This study addresses the issue from the 
point of view of politics and tries to reveal the political motives behind the financial 
market transactions carried out by the Central and East European policy makers and their 
international counterparts. The paper focuses on the foreign debt management of the 
Hungarian and Slovenian state actors in the global financial markets, as well as in their 
home markets. The puzzle - the selected comparison seeks to investigate - lies in the 
finite difference of the debt management strategies the two CEE countries followed in the 
early 1990s in relation to a fairly similar amount of debt burden. With regards to the 
Hungarian foreign debt, policy makers opted for a rather passive and internal oriented 
debt management policy whereas their Slovenian counterparts engaged in active and 
externally oriented debt re-negotiations.  
 The argument proposed here combines a theoretical refinement of international 
financial markets as locally embedded social relations with a domestically oriented 
institutional analysis of foreign debt management policies. I argue that in order to 
understand the differences between the two states’ debt management strategies, it is not 
enough to analyze the structural differences of the debts or the two economies but it is as 
important to look at the institutional differences within which certain strategies were 
proposed, rejected or accepted. As every possible structural constraint allows for a variety 
of policy solutions, in order to understand why the selected strategies were pursued, the 
analysis should be conducted at the level of institutions within which a given policy 
paradigm counteracted with the local, historically contingent relations. At this level of 
analysis it is also possible to ask questions of the relations between the globalization of 
finance and the changing role of the state in these two transition prone Central and East 
European countries.          
 
                                                          
1 This paper was first presented at the third meeting of the European Political Economy Consortium (EPIC) 
in Florence Sept. 2002. Thank goes to all the participants of the workshop series. I am also grateful for 
critiques and comments to Amy Minett, Morten Ougaard, Anna Khakee, and Anna Leander.  
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In the following, I first present the strategies of the two states’ policy makers, second, I 
compare the institutional background of the two policies and finally I conclude with the 
reconfiguration of politics. 
 
2. The research interest 
 
The early 1990s brought changes in numerous Central and Eastern European countries’ 
debt management strategies. Poland successfully lobbied for debt relief at the Paris Club, 
Bulgaria defaulted on its foreign obligations, Slovenia managed to reduce its share of the 
Yugoslav foreign debt by a relatively high portion, while Hungary refinanced the whole 
part of its giant debt in due time. Outside the region the Baker Plan and later the Brady 
Plan alleviated the debt problem of many Latin American countries for some time. It 
seems to me that the pure diversity of the solutions the international financial community 
found for the debt problems qualifies some of the early observations on the structural 
reconfiguration of the global financial markets: the diminishing room for maneuvering of 
the state. The term globalization of financial market has been most often applied by IPE 
scholars to describe those structural changes in the international financial architecture 
which alleviated the cross border flow of capital2 (money)3. These changes were said to 
require a general liberalization and opening up of domestic financial markets, which then 
further circumscribed the role of the state in financial matters.4 This paper is interested in 
these changes in the role of the state in international finance. 5
                                                          
2 See for example: Maxfield S. 1998. Effects of International Portfolio Flows on Government Policy 
Choice. In Capital Flows and Financial Crises, ed. Kahler M., Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 
3 This refers to Susan Strange’s analytical distinction between money and finance: Money is considered as 
the determination of currency values, which refers also to the international monetary system used to 
exchange currencies. Finance (credit here) is the system whereby credit is created, bought, and sold. (1990: 
259, Review of International Studies, 16, 3, 259-74.), different end-purposes to each.  
4 Keohane R.O., and H. V. Milner, ed. 1996. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, Epstein G. 1996. International Capital Mobility and the Scope for National 
Economic Management. In States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization, ed. Boyer R., pp. 211-27. 
London, New York: Routledge 
5 See for example: Pérez, Sofia A. (1997). Banking on Privilege: The Politics of Spanish Financial Reform. 
Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press. Loriaux, Michel, Meredith Woo-Commings, Kent E. Calder, 
Sylvia Maxfield, and Sofia Perez (1997). Capital Ungoverned: Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist 
State. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press. Kurzer, Paulett (1993). Business and Banking: Political 
Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Haggard, Stephan, 
Chung H. Lee, Sylvia Maxfield, Ed. (1993). The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries. Ithaca and 
London, Cornell University Press.   
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For this purpose, out of the Central and East European region, the comparison of the debt 
management policies of Slovenia and Hungary stand as the most indicative.6 There are 
several reasons behind this choice. First, the different debt management of Latin 
American and African countries have often been discussed in relation to the globalization 
of financial markets, and there has been little attention directed to the CEE countries’ 
debt policies from a global angle. Second, Slovenia and  Hungary are apt candidates as 
their debt structure was the closest among CEE countries (with comparable shares of 
commercial bank, sovereign and IFI debts, and financial bonds). Furthermore in the early 
1990s both countries’ policy makers continued a lengthened struggle to get the balance of 
payment closer to equilibrium (unlike Poland which received debt relief or the Baltic 
states, whose governments denied any sort of Soviet debt financing), and none of the two 
states opted for default (like Bulgaria did). Finally both countries’ debt management had 
serious implications for the states’ banking sector policies. Yet, these two newly 
democratized countries have followed very different policies in relation to their inherited  
debt burdens.  Therefore, the research question is: What accounts for the differences in 
the two states’ debt management in the era of the globalization of financial markets?  
 
2.2. On data  
 
There is a certain unease with providing data for my arguments. Not simply because 
records on debt negotiations are generally kept secret, but also because the Slovene debt 
issue was simply not resolved till 1995. Therefore the Slovene policy makers whenever 
asked by think tanks, or International Financial Institutions (EBRD, IMF) provided data 
which clearly favored their own interpretation of the debt issue.  It is also indicative that 
none of the political and economic risk assessing Rating Agencies (Moody’s or Standard 
& Poor’s) were invited to Slovenia before 1996, because these institutions could have 
brought up delicate questions in relation to the level of indebtedness of Slovenia. 
Nevertheless, what seems crucial for the case selection is that the Yugoslav debt before 
                                                          
6 Clearly, I select cases on the dependent variable (debt policy) which is not recommended by KKV. 
However, they also neglect the discussion of Mill’s method of most different cases which prioritizes, in the 
case of two countries’ comparison, the selection on dependent variable.  
Varieties of Debt Management in CEECs 
 
     Page 4 
the dissolution of the country in 1987 exceeded 21 billion USD7 and the comparative 
Hungarian number was 21.5 billion USD8 in 1990 and it was far from clear how much of 
the Yugoslav debt Slovenia should take over.  
 
The following table is an example of the Slovene authorities’ understanding of the level 
of indebtedness of Slovenia, which in the course of the following discussion of the 
Slovene debt management policy, I hope to clarify: 
 
Gross external debt (USD mn) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Slovenia 1741 1873 2258 2970 4010 4176 4959 5491 
Hungary 21644 24566 28526 31660 28043 24395 27280 29279 
Notes: In the case of Slovenia unallocated debt of Yugoslavia is not included till 1995 
Source: WIIW(2000): Countries in Transition 2000, Handbook of Statistics, WIIW, Vienna and 
WIIW(1996): Countries in Transition 1996, Handbook of Statistics, WIIW, Vienna 
 
 
3. The debt management of Slovenia and Hungary 
3.1 Slovenia   
 
From June 1991, the constitution of Slovenia, which declared the independence of the 
new state, asserted the continuity of the existence of the Slovene state. It implied that 
Slovenia was an inheritor of the Slovene Republic of the former Yugoslavia: it was an 
inheritor both of its assets and liabilities, including a due share of its foreign debt. The 
aim of this section is to draw a general outline of the bargaining between the Slovene 
authorities and the foreign creditors in relation to the inherited foreign debt from 
Yugoslavia.  
                                                          
7 OECD Development Center, Technical Paper N° 54 “Debt Conversions in Yugoslavia”, by Mojmir Mrak, 
Research Programme on Financial Policies for the Global Dissemination of Economic Growth, Head of 
Project: Jean-Claude Berthélemy, February 1992, p. 48. 
8 WIIW(2000): Countries in Transition 2000, Handbook of Statistics, WIIW, Vienna, p 443. 
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3.1.1 The heritage 
 
The foreign debt of the former Yugoslavia consisted of three different kinds of debt 
portions: Yugoslavia borrowed from sovereign lenders (the members of the Paris Club), it 
contracted loans with private commercial banks (the members of the London Club) and 
drew loans from the International Financial Institutions, namely the World Bank, the IMF 
and the EBRD.9 As a consequence of the nature of these contracts, from 1991 until the 
agreement with the London Club in 1995, the Slovene authorities faced external pressure 
to reimburse the whole amount of money the former Yugoslavia once contracted with the 
London Club. (in the calculation of Mojmir Mrak, the chief debt negotiator this debt 
stood at 15 billion USD).10 The comparative Hungarian amount of gross foreign debt as 
of 1990 was roughly 21 billion USD.11 Both numbers represent countries well above the 
red line of the most indebted countries in the world.   
 
Before entering into the details of the negotiations, it is important to stop for a moment 
and ask: Why did the Slovene authorities not consider refusing to reimburse the Yugoslav 
debt, since these contracts were not initiated by the Slovene state? (As for instance the 
Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian governments proceeded to do in relation to the Soviet 
debt.) The answer is connected to the origins of the sovereignty of Slovenia, which the 
new authorities of Slovenia were striving to have acknowledged. Independent Slovenia 
was at the same time a new state in the international system, as well as an inheritor of the 
Yugoslav past. Following this logic, the Slovene negotiating team had to insist on the 
willingness of Slovenia to reimburse a part of the Yugoslav debt, because if the debt was 
                                                          
9 The contracts were severely modified in 1983, when at the height of an international financial crisis, 
Yugoslavia declared a moratorium on financing its foreign obligations. The new financial agreements 
signed by the London Club members incorporated two new elements: a sovereign state guarantee from the 
Yugoslav federal state and the so called ‘joint and several liability clause’. 
10 It means that if Yugoslavia had not had to dissolve and the other contractor from the part of Yugoslavia, 
would not have been able or willing to pay, Ljubljanska Banka would have been the same responsible to 
finance the whole amount.  
11 Countries in Transition WIIW Handbook of Statistics 2000, The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies, p. 443.   
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separable, it no longer belonged to any one country but to former Yugoslavia constituent 
parts.12  
 
3.1.2 Entering into the International Financial Institutions 
 
As a first step, the Slovene policy makers set up a negotiating team, co-chaired by the 
Minister of Finance and the President of the Central Bank, which included several 
Slovene experts who had gained experience in dealing with international financial 
partners in Belgrade or abroad.13 The most important reservation is that within the 
negotiating team it was possible to discuss rather diverse views on the functioning of ‘the 
economy’ and the neo-classical views were not necessarily dominant. The priority of the 
Slovene negotiating team - in settling the Yugoslav debt - was to gain an official status 
for Slovenia within the international financial institutions.  
 
The global sphere showed its multi-layered and overlapping characteristics to the Slovene 
negotiators. First, in order to transmit the support of powerful states for their act of 
independence to the field of financial matters, the Slovene delegation started negotiations 
on membership with those financial institutions whose operation had been most tightly 
linked to the political will of the states. In other words, in settling their financial issues 
with private actors, they tried to capitalize on the political support of the states. Becoming 
a member of the IFIs was the key for Slovenia to gain access to new credits from the 
international bankers’ community or from sovereign lenders.14 In addition, just as in 
1991, not all the states of the international community subscribed to Slovene 
independence, the IMF – an IFI under the dominance of the USA, a supporter of the 
Slovene independence – was a site of political will-formation of states, which was 
supposed to facilitate the formation of a consensus of states’ opinion in line with the 
Slovene negotiators’ will. Thus, not really surprisingly but still importantly we can see 
                                                          
12 Irwin Z. T. 1995. Yugoslavia's Relations with European States. In Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, 
Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community, ed. L. S. A. Sabrina,  P. Ramet, pp. 349-92. Boulder: 
Westview Press 
13 Interview with Mojmir Mrak 2002 
14 Mojmir Mrak, Janez Potocnik. 2002. The Transition Process in Slovenia: Transformation to an EU-
Compatible Economy. Journal of International Relations and Development 5: 37-62 
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how the Slovene negotiators benefited from the overlapping characteristics of the IMF 
authority in both the field of the private actors and the states.  
 
In order to gain acceptance by the IFIs, the Slovene negotiators, contrary to their initial 
will15, started independently from other successor states to ‘clean up the table’. First, they 
divided up the Yugoslav debt16: into allocated and non-allocated debt. The first category 
stood for “the loans used directly by legal entities based on the territory of the individual 
Republics”, the second for “the loans used by the federal Yugoslav institutions whose 
immediate beneficiaries are not ascertainable.”17
 
The negotiations with the EBRD, the IMF and the World Bank on membership lasted 
almost a whole year. Because the member states of these institutions had to agree among 
themselves on the crucial question: How to understand the dissolution of Yugoslavia? 
The consensus reached among the member states of the European Union was born on the 
basis of the Report by the Badinter Commission of mid-1992, which argued for the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia as opposed to the unilateral separation of Slovenia. On the 
basis of this report, Slovenia - before entering into any other financial institution - 
became a member of the EBRD in August 1992.  
 
Some months later in December 1992, the IMF made its first declaration on the end of 
Yugoslavia by asserting its dissolution. This decision was extremely important for the 
Slovene authorities. Since the IMF declared dissolution it had to propose its own 
principle for the separation of the SDR quota of the former Yugoslavia among the 
successor states. The IMF proposal was that Slovenia should take over 16.39% of the 
debt and quota of the former Yugoslavia. By accepting these terms, Slovenia became an 
official member of the IMF in January 1993. Somewhat later in the same year, the 
                                                          
15 Their initial idea was to negotiate the allocation of the Yugoslav debt among the successor states.  
16 On the basis of data the Yugoslav National Bank.  
17 Mrak M. 1996. Becoming a 'Normal' Country in the International Financial Community, The Case of 
Slovenia. In: Into Europe?, Perspectives from Britain and Slovenia, ed. Hafner D. F., Cox T., pp. 251-74. 
Ljubljana: Scientific Library, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ribnikar I, Elton G. McGoun. 2001. The 
Financial Sector in Slovenia. mimeo, pp. 1-8, Pleskovits B, Sachs J. D. 1994. Political Independence and 
Economic Reform in Slovenia. In: The Transition in Eastern Europe, ed. OJ Blanchard, Kenneth A. Froot,. 
Sachs J. D, pp. 191-220. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press 
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Slovene negotiators signed an agreement with the World Bank, too. Thus, in a way, 
becoming a member of the World Bank was preconditioned by becoming one of the IMF.  
 
3.1.3 The deal with the Paris Club 
 
Slovenia started negotiations with the 13 states of the Paris club of sovereign lenders 
soon after gaining independence. The message Slovenia, the Slovene negotiators sent to 
the member states of the Paris Club was clear: It was willing to take over the Slovenian 
portion of the Yugoslav debt, but it was not willing to finance the whole amount of it. 
The negotiations formally started in 1993, after EBRD, IMF, and World Bank 
membership was achieved. At this time the exact amount Slovenia would take over was 
clear: the full amount of the allocated debt and 16.39% of the non-allocated debt of 
Yugoslavia. The member states of the Paris Club after a short hesitation agreed to this 
proposal and an agreement in principle was signed in June 1993.18   
 
3.1.3 London Club, the commercial banks go hard 
 
To strike a deal with the syndicate of the commercial banks was the most delicate issue as 
it involved the most participants as well as contained the famous clause on joint and 
several liabilities.19 This clause was an extra safety belt for the London Club members. It 
implied that each party to the contract from within Yugoslavia (the Yugoslav state, the 
individual republics and the commercial banks) was individually responsible for the 
repayment of the whole amount of the contracted debt. The London Club naturally 
insisted that Slovenia should start financing the whole amount of the outstanding former 
Yugoslav debt (7.1 billion USD).20 In 1992, the Slovenes sent off their calculated share of 
                                                          
18 Interview with  Mojmir Mrak 2002 
19 On the side of the former Yugoslavia, 10 commercial banks and the state had signed the credit contract in 
1988. The internal Yugoslav agreement between the republics-based commercial banks and the Yugoslav 
National Bank, the paying agent,  was the following: The commercial banks were responsible for 
transferring the due amount to the YNB, if they failed to finance, the National Bank of Yugoslavia had the 
right to block the Republics’ budget. 
20 OECD Development Center, Technical Paper N° 54 “Debt Conversions in Yugoslavia”, by Mojmir 
Mrak, Research Programme on Financial Policies for the Global Dissemination of Economic Growth, Head 
of Project: Jean-Claude Berthélemy, February 1992. p.53. 
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the debt to the London based agent of the commercial banks.21 However, the commercial 
banks considered this amount as a portion of the Yugoslav debt and not as a portion of 
the Slovene obligations. As a countermeasure, the Slovene authorities stopped the 
transfer of further money and initiated negotiations. Their suggestion, which was 
foreseeable, was that they were willing to take over exactly the same share of what they 
had taken over from the IMF granted debt.22 As of 1992, the proposition was altogether 
rejected by the London Club.  
  
The negotiations between the Slovene authorities and the representatives of the London 
Club lasted for three years from June 1992 till June 1995, when an agreement in principle 
was signed. Clearly, the Slovene negotiating position was very weak. In early 1994, when 
according to the 1988 agreement Slovenia had to start reimbursing the principal of the 
debt, it did not yet have an agreement with the commercial banks on exactly how much to 
transfer. The situation was dangerous as Slovenia was not meeting the word of the 
contract, which Yugoslavia had signed with the London Club members and this in 
principle gave the commercial banks the right to compensate themselves from the 
Slovene financial reserves held in diverse international banks’ accounts. As such, it was a 
real threat to the financial sovereignty of the country, which inclined the Slovene 
authorities to extensively lobby the influential states’ governments to exert an influence 
over ‘their’ commercial banks to accept the Slovene suggestions.23  
 
In addition, in 1994, within the framework of banking sector restructuring but also tightly 
connected to the debt negotiations, the Slovene authorities decided to nationalize the two 
largest banks. The nationalization step was necessary in order to clarify the ownership of 
the assets and liabilities of the two banks: among Slovenian end-users, in relation to 
former Yugoslav federal institutions and finally vis-a-vis other successor states. Although 
                                                          
21 The last agreement Yugoslavia signed with the London Club members (the 1988 New Financial 
Agreement) included a five year long moratorium of Yugoslav payments until the end of 1993. During this 
moratorium the payment was transferred only after the interest. 
22 The whole of the allocated debt and 16.39% of the non-allocated debt. 
23 Interview with Mojmir Mrak 2002 
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transparency of ownership rights was important for all parties involved, it was most 
urgently needed to clarify the Slovene share in the Yugoslav foreign debt.24  
 
Given these constraints, the final outcome achieved in 1995 was the following: Slovenia 
accepted to pay over 18% (instead of the proposed 16.39%) of the Yugoslav debt due to 
the London Club members. But this deal in fact was extremely good for the Slovenians. 
As whatever the condition reached with the London Club was, it meant automatically that 
Slovenia was not liable for the rest. The most important observation in relation to the deal 
between the Slovene state actors and the commercial banks is the political style of the 
bargain. To agree on terms with each other was not primarily an economic question for 
the Slovene negotiators but a political issue and concerned the future of Slovene 
sovereignty.  
 
3.2 Hungary 
 
The peculiarities of the Hungarian external debt management of the early 1990s rest in 
the absence of its externality. As much as in the past, Hungarian policy makers since the 
first free elections ruled out any sort of rescheduling, debt relief or other form of contract 
breaking and insisted on timely financing the Hungarian debt. Their aim was to maintain 
the unique debtor history of Hungary: a highly indebted country which never defaulted. 
In the case of Hungary, globalization of finance seems to work in line with its classical 
presentation:25 The Hungarian policy makers saw no alternative to the refinancing of their 
giant foreign debt, as the global financial markets presented an external pressure on state 
policy formation and the state ‘had to’ adopt the neo-liberal suggestions. The argument of 
this paper is that the extent to which Hungarian policy makers were ‘forced’ to follow 
                                                          
24 According to the Bank of Slovenia, the fact that these two banks’ balance sheets did not reflect their 
‘actual’ assets was due to the inclusions of those claims and obligations, which belonged to the former 
federal institutions. Therefore, the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia on July 27 1994, adopted an 
amendment to the Constitutional Law. By this law, the Nova Ljubljanska Banka and the Nova Kreditna 
Banka Maribor were established, taking over the operations and part of the assets of Ljubljanska Banka and 
Kreditna Banka Maribor. All claims and liabilities to former federal institutions, and obligations of end-
users of loans from other republics of former Yugoslavia were cleared and only those guaranteed by the 
Slovenian government remained. Bank of Slovenia, Annual Report, 1994, p14-15. 
25 Hay, C., and Rosamond, B. 2002. Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of 
economic imperatives. Journal of European Public Policy 9 (2):147-167. 
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neo-liberal considerations was largely determined by their own, past driven interpretation 
of and reaction to the nature of these constraints.  
 
The aim of this section is to outline the most important decisions and strategies of the 
Hungarian authorities in relation to the country’s giant foreign debt in the first part of the 
1990s. The exploration of the Hungarian foreign debt management strategy gives an 
insight not only into the marked differences to other states’ debt management strategies, 
but it also allows us to see the indeed high, but altered ‘state-intervention’ requirement of 
many neo-liberal policies.26  
 
3.2.1 The debtor history of Hungary 
 
Hungary like many developing countries extensively borrowed from the cheap credit 
available on the international financial markets throughout the 1970s. In the two financial 
crises of the 1980s, when many Latin American and Central and Eastern European 
countries declared a moratorium on their external obligations, Hungary came out 
unharmed. During the first crisis in 1982, when the credit markets dried up for Eastern 
European countries, the Hungarian policy makers after long political consideration 
decided to join the International Monetary Fund. The negotiations with the IMF were 
conducted by the reformists of the National Bank of Hungary, an institution, which, then 
already for long, enjoyed the exclusive right in Hungary to negotiate with foreign 
creditors and the IMF. The key decisions concerning the external debt were the exclusive 
domain of Janos Fekete, whose authority derived from his personal contact with the 
Communist Party’s leadership.27  
 
In the 1980s, the problem with the foreign debt was that Hungary was not able to 
generate sufficient export revenues to service current debt payments, thus Hungary had to 
                                                          
26 Clark I. 1999. Globalization and International Relations Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.92. 
27 Bruszt L., Stark D. 1998. Post-socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Bartlett D. L. 1997. The  Political Economy of Dual 
Transformations: Market Reforms and Democratization in Hungary. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, Andor L. 2000. Hungary on the road to the European Union : transition in blue, Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger 
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assume new credits and draw on hard currency reserves in order to cover its outstanding 
debt obligations.28 Since 1985 the debt structure has been increasingly modified: less 
sovereign credit, more commercial bank credit (mainly German and Japanese) and 
increasingly commercial bonds and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) balance of 
payment credits were contracted.  Nevertheless, in the period 1984 to 1986, the gross 
convertible currency debt nearly doubled.29 As mentioned above, in 1990 Hungary was 
responsible for the reimbursement of roughly 21 billion USD, an amount comparable 
with the debt level to that of Mexico, Brazil, Poland, Bulgaria or the former Yugoslavia.  
 
At the end of the 1980s, with the mounting dissatisfaction of the political system, foreign 
financial obligations being one of the most important reasons, the opposition leaders 
claimed this made regime change inevitable. Yet, besides some quiet murmuring, not 
even the opposition leaders went so far as to strongly demand debt relief for Hungary on 
the international scene.30
 
3.2.2 Internal oriented foreign debt policy  
 
After the free election in 1990, the newly elected Prime Minister, Jozsef Antall, after a 
secret effort in Washington, ruled out any future Hungarian demand for rescheduling. He 
did so at the moment when international commercial banks had just concluded the Brady 
Plan: a debt and debt service rescheduling agreement with Mexico, and a year before 
Poland gained complete debt relief from the members of the Paris Club.31 Until the 
reimbursement of a significant part of the foreign debt in 1995, no other unofficial or 
official attempt was made by Hungarian policy makers to start a negotiation procedure.    
 
                                                          
28 Kornai J. 1996a. Adjustment without Recession: A Case Study of the Hungarian Stabilization. Budapest, 
Kornai J. 1996b. Paying the Bill for Goulash Communism: Hungarian Development and Macro-
stabilization in a Political Economy Perspective. Social Research p. 63. 
29 The net debt position got even worse as Hungary borrowed in yen and Deutsch Mark while placing the 
bulk of Hungary’s hard currency assets in dollar whose value jumped after the Park Plaza Accord on 
currency realignment. (dollar depreciation). 
30 Szakolczai Á., Horvath, Á. 1989. The Dissolution of Communist Power, The Case of Hungary. London 
and New York: Routledge 
31 Ibid. p. 52. 
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In the early 1990s, as a continuation of past conduct, in which a closed political system 
only allowed for the carefully selected members of the National Bank to be in contact 
with western creditors, the issue of foreign debt was kept under the auspices of the 
National Bank reformers.32 However, the increasingly powerful National Bankers 
freedom of action was circumscribed with strengthened institutionalized political checks. 
It was the new Law on Central Banking which codified the National Bank’s operational 
control over debt policy. Against this new legal framework, the leadership of the National 
Bank formulated a strategy aiming at stabilizing Hungary’s debt position, which utterly 
ruled out any form of negotiations with foreign creditors. The authorities of the National 
Bank argued – as in the 1980s – that what was decisive was not the literal size of the 
country’s external debt but the country’s capacity to sustain net capital inflow. The 
National Bank economists’ strategy of stabilizing the net debt position of Hungary 
comprised four factors33:  
 
First, the Central Bank had to change the structure of outstanding debt. This meant 
lengthening the maturity profile of the debt by shifting from short to long term financing 
and lowering interest-payment by replacing bank loans with low cost bonds.34 This 
reliance on debt financing circumscribed opportunities for ex post debt rescheduling. 
Unlike syndicated bank credits, which comprised a group of creditors who could 
negotiate rescheduling under the auspices of London Club, bonds involved a multitude of 
private investors who lacked institutionalized means of renegotiating debt relief. 
 
This strategy and its result was often presented in public discussions as the major obstacle 
impeding the Hungarian policy makers from asking for debt relief or debt rescheduling in 
the early 1990s. On the one hand, it was asserted that commercial banks could not be 
pulled into political bargaining; on the other, the investors of the stock markets were 
presented as a faceless community whose identity was unknown and hence it was 
impossible to initiate negotiations with them. For the present purpose, in order to qualify 
                                                          
32 Varhegyi E. 2002. Bankvilag Magyarorszagon, Helikon, Budapest 
33 This part draws on or indeed summarizes the empirical findings of: Bartlett D. L. 1997. The  Political 
Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reforms and Democratization in Hungary. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press. p. 175-181.  
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this argument we do not have to go so far as to develop credible counterfactual arguments 
against this line of reasoning.35 It is enough to acknowledge that the swap option was not 
forced upon Hungary but was rather the result of the Central Bankers’ conscious 
decision, which indeed could have been different as of 1985 through to approximately 
1991. At the same time, political bargaining with commercial banks, as we saw in the 
case of Slovenia, was possible as of the early 1990s.   
 
Second, the National Bank’s strategy of managing the net debt required quick 
improvement in Hungarian exports towards a convertible currency area. Third, the 
National Bank and the Ministry of Finance had to maintain tight monetary growth and 
fiscal spending. However, to keep the budget expenditure tightly curved proved to be a 
difficult task to sustain in times of high political pressure for compensating the victims of 
the communist  regime. Fourth, maintaining a net capital inflow required increases in 
foreign direct investment, which would bolster hard currency reserves and relieve the 
National Bank’s dependence on external credit to finance the economy’s financial needs. 
The legal framework established by the communist party in the late 1980s and the long 
reputation of Hungary as being the most open of the communist countries proved to be 
good indicators for potential foreign investors.36  
 
Finally, it is important to note that in the first Hungarian government, lead by the 
conservative Jozsef Antall, there was little interest (and expertise) in finding a long term 
solution for the threatening indebtedness of the country despite the mounting debt 
problem. (i.e. a debt management strategy). The newly elected politicians were much 
more concerned with setting up a new democratic architecture and, as a result,  the 
questions regarding the reorganization of the economy were usually addressed with some 
delay.37 Also, in the international political turmoil of the early 1990s, the lack of a clear 
political strategy towards the debt was in a way the continuation of the practice of the 
Socialist Party: a strategy of balancing on the edges of world politics. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 Hungary began issuing bonds in 1985, the first communist country to do so. 
35 Jochen Loretzen developed a very illustrious counterfactual explanation. 
36 Between 1990 and 1994, total FDI in Hungary approached 7 billion dollar more than the other East 
European countries combined. 
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 By 1994, at the time of the new elections, the foreign debt question had become a 
pressing political factor for the election of the socialist-liberal government who promised 
a more ‘professional’ management of Hungary’s  external obligations.38 It included the 
privatization of important elements of the banking sector and other strategic sectors, 
combined with a harsh austerity program, the famous Bokros package. As a result, by 
1996, Hungary managed to reimburse a large enough portion of its external debt 
obligations. 
 
4. Contrasting foreign debt policies 
 
The core contrast I see in the two countries’ debt management is that in Slovenia the 
foreign debt was taken as a part of the process of building up international recognition for 
Slovenia, or indeed as the chief debt negotiator called it, the establishment of an identity 
for Slovenia in the international financial community. In the meantime, in Hungary, the 
foreign debt was considered as a proof of the non-viability of the socialist regime, and its 
reimbursement as another inevitable price the country had to pay for the long run benefit 
of economic growth, which is the reward of creditworthy countries. In Hungary, the 
financing of the debt was considered as an integral part of the game a state has to play, 
which constitutes the ‘market economy’.  
 
In more detail, there appear to be three different areas of the social construction process 
constituting the foreign debt management strategies in the two countries which can help 
us to understand the differences in the outcomes. First, there was a marked difference in 
the discursive construction of the meaning of foreign debt service. It was considered a 
political issue in Slovenia and as an economic matter in Hungary. Second, there was a 
marked difference in the institutional underpinnings of the debt management. In Slovenia, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 Eva Varhegyi(2002): Bankvilag Magyarorszagon, Helikon, Budapest 
38 The new Prime Minister, Gyula Horn, wrote a letter to Khol, asking for sovereign loan, but Khol 
suggested a neoliberal policy to implement before he would grant a loan with such conditions - as Bokros 
observed - if Hungary had been able to implement the suggestions, it would not have needed the loan any 
more. Rádai E. 2001. Pénzügyminiszterek Reggelire: Rádai E. Beszélget Békési Lászlóval, Bokros 
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a negotiating team was formed to deal with the debt, which comprised of professionals 
with considerably diverse backgrounds allowing for a non-neo-liberal reading of the 
economy, whereas in Hungary debt management was the exclusive domain of the 
economists of the National Bank and the Financial Ministers. Finally, there was a 
difference between the influence of the IFIs on national policy makers. Historically, the 
Slovene authorities were not that much exposed to IMF - or other IFIs - initiated training 
of a neoliberal understanding of the economy as the Hungarian leading economists. These 
three factors, with the help of many other non-explored were present and constituted the 
different debt management strategies. As all of them are linked to socially embedded 
agents, we can see a possibility for their eventual different course.  
 
I would like to start by exploring the discursive struggles over the meaning of ‘foreign 
debt’, which characterized the Hungarian and Slovenian social reality during the early 
1990s. I will also try to show that the new political and economic institutions, in which 
the foreign debt policies were embedded, were disseminating similar assertions to many 
other policy areas. First, it seems that the nature of financial debt was articulated as 
political in Slovenia and as economic in Hungary. In Slovenia the political nature of the 
foreign debts meant that the concerns surrounding the foreign debt problem were tightly 
linked to the establishment of the “identity of Slovenia in the International Financial 
Community”39. In Hungary, foreign debt management was understood within the 
confines of neoclassical economics, which equates the availability of new credits with 
sound economic policies and ‘good’ debtor behavior.40 These two concepts are the most 
important  factors which constitute what Maxfield called the ‘creditworthiness of a 
country’41. Thus, creditworthiness was the primary target of Hungarian policy makers. 
The global financial markets as globally institutionalized financial practices presented a 
constraint for Hungary. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lajossal, Kupa Mihállyal, Medgyessy Péterrel, Rabár Ferenccel, Szabó Ivánnal, Budapest, Helikon/ 
Beszélő, (Inteview with six Ministers of Finance of Hungary) 
39 Mrak M. 1996. Becoming a 'Normal' Country in the International Financial Community, The Case of 
Slovenia. In Into Europe?, Perspectives from Britain and Slovenia, ed. Hafner D. F., Cox T., pp. 251-74. 
Ljubljana: Scientific Library, Faculty of Social Sciences 
40 Lorentzen J. 1995. Opening up Hungary to the world market : external constraints and opportunities, 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York: Macmillan, St Martin Press p. 39. 
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 Second, why creditworthiness was the main target is not very difficult to discover once 
one looks at the institutional organizations of the Hungarian foreign debt issues. As many 
researchers have described,42 the Hungarian National Bank since the early 1980s onward 
managed to accumulate a formidably large array of technical and informational resources. 
It was able to oppose any suggestions in policy shift. Indeed, not only foreign debt 
management but also the foreign exchange policy of post-communist Hungary bore the 
imprint of the Central Bank.43 The Slovenian institutional organization of foreign debt 
management, however, shows a marked contrast to the Hungarian solution. Here, shortly 
after the declaration of independence a negotiating team was built comprising of  the 
Prime Minister’s advisors and co-chaired by the head of the Central Bank and the 
Minister of Finance, which included many experts with diverse experience.44  
 
Third, in Slovenia, as opposed to Hungary, the wide-ranging views of the negotiators on 
the nature of the economy were all the more assured as few of the members of the 
negotiating team had had a close, intimate relation with the IMF in the past. Because the 
heavily indebted Yugoslavia’s negotiations with the IMF took place in Belgrade at the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia.45 And as Slovenia in the early 1990s was not in need of 
IMF initiated medicines to cure its economy, the Slovene debt negotiators were not 
exposed so intensively to IMF training as the state employed financiers in other Central 
and Eastern European countries. Since the early 1980s the IMF was deeply involved in 
the Hungarian economy’s restructuring: initially as an observer, later more directly via 
the conditionality assigned to new tranches of IMF loans. As Hungary was a member of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
41 Maxfield S. 1997. The gatekeepers of growth: the international political economy of central banking in 
developing countries, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
42 Bartlett D. L. 1997. The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reforms and 
Democratization in Hungary. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, Bela Kiraly AB, ed. 1995. 
Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-1994. New York: Columbia University Press, Csikos-Nagy B. 1990. 
Appreciation of the IMF and World Bank Activity in Hungary. Acta Oeconomica 42: 253-66, Shugart M. 
Haggard R., Kaufmann M. 1997. Politics, Institutions and Macroeconomic Adjustment: Hungarian Fiscal 
Policy-Making in Comparative Perspective. Budapest: Collegium Budapest, Greskovits B. 1998. Bothers-in 
Arms or Rivals in Politics? Top Politicians and Top Policy Makers in the Hungarian Transformation. 
Budapest: Collegium Budapest  
43 Bartlett D. L. 1997. The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reforms and 
Democratization in Hungary. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press p. 178. 
44 Interview with Mojmir Mrak  
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the IMF, its training and past experiences with IMF negotiation the Hungarian National 
Bankers accumulated, formulated the core of how the Hungarian central bankers, the 
responsible for debt management, perceived the nature of the economy.  
 
To sum up, debt policy management was embedded in both countries in a rich web of 
norms, rules, concepts and social practices. I have spelled out the meaning of foreign debt 
and considered the institutional organization of foreign financial issues in the two 
countries. As we can not possibly know exactly why certain decisions were taken and not 
others, I hope these matrices are useful tools to guide our understanding.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I would like to conclude with a few observations in relation to the changing role of the 
state in the globalizing financial sphere. First, with regards to Hungarian debt 
management policy, the above comparison showed that the “there is no alternative” 
approach to the re-financing of the debt of the Hungarian National Bankers was a 
particular social construct and as we saw in the case of Slovenia there was indeed a 
possibility to follow a different course of management in the early 1990s. Thus more 
broadly, the effect of the globalization of finance on state conduct largely depended upon 
the local institutionalization of financial matters, namely who had control over what kind 
of decisions and what was the power of these particular institutional fields. Nevertheless, 
I do not intend to climb too high on Ian Hacking’s classifications46 of the political 
relevance of the reflection on the constructed nature of our social reality (to what extent a 
social construct is amendable). Here it is enough to assert that the most important impact 
of globalization on state policy formation was not simply the external force of 
international creditors which demanded the refinancing of the debt. Rather, as Saskia 
Sassen and others47 have pointed out, globalization is materialized by the local 
                                                                                                                                                                             
45 Woodward S. 1995. Balkan Tragedy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. pp. 1-81  
46 Hacking I. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 
47 Sassen S. 2000. Excavating Power: In Search of Frontier Zones and New Actors. Theory, Culture and 
Society 17: 163-70, Bourdieu P, Wacquant L. 1999. On the Cunning of the Imperialist Reason. Theory, 
Culture and Society 16: 41-58.  
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institutionalization of global norms (this time the neo-classical views in the Central 
Bank), which internally exercised power on the state’s debt policy.   
 
Second, in relation to Slovenian policy makers or debt negotiators’ struggle to have 
acknowledged the sovereignty of Slovenia within the international financial community, 
globalization of finance showed its heterogeneity. This concerns the alleged paradox 
between financial globalization as a state autonomy curbing force and the increasing 
number of new states in world politics. This paradox was observed by many and loosened 
by Zygmunt Bauman, who argued for the complementarity of the two processes – the 
increasing mobility of capital and the expansion of new (and weak) states - as they 
together constitute what he called the global reallocation of freedom to act or freedom of 
movement.48 While this observation seems to hold in many cases, in relation to the 
Slovene debt negotiators or in general policy makers, this study showed a rather active 
and uncompromising attitude on the side of the “weak” state’s representatives. That is 
while it is true that the first and foremost priority of the new Slovene elite was to enter 
International Financial Institutions and assure the European Union of its wish to join, thus 
curb the newly gained sovereignty, a reconfiguration of the above paradox still applies: 
Throughout the 1990s, the Slovenian authorities simultaneously sought to protect their 
national state interest in relation to the debt (but also in relation to finance in general), 
while becoming a member (in the case of the IMF) or preparing for membership (in the 
case of the European Union) of such institutions that clearly prioritize the separation of 
economic and political49 and promote the compliance of all parties to the laws of the free 
market as a prerequisite to long term development.50 In order to account for this paradox, 
globalization of finance once again should be brought down to the level of domestic 
politics so that these sorts of controversies - embedded in the process - become evident.    
 
Finally, this analysis was not meant to be a critique of any of the two countries’ debt 
management strategies. I have simply attempted to understand a set of foreign debt 
                                                          
48 Bauman Z. 1996. Globalization: The Human Consequences. Oxford: Polity Press  p68-69.  
49 Patomaki H. 2001. Democratising Globalization: the Leverage of the Tobin Tax, London Zed Books 
50 Lindstrom, Nicole (2000): Rethinking Sovereignty:  The Politics of European Integration in Slovenia, in: 
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, 30 – 45 
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related decisions from within the context in which they transpired, in Hungary and 
Slovenia. By focusing on the questions of different institutionalization of conducting 
foreign debt management, I have hoped to shed some light on how the global and local 
considerations jointly shaped the policy makers’ decisions in the two countries. This 
involved looking beyond the flows of foreign capital and structural characteristics of 
world markets and trying to see the making of foreign debt policies as social processes.   
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